FIDES: Hardware-assisted Compartments for Securing Functional Programs

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Two major causes for the rapidly increasing threat of cyber-attacks are unsafe languages like C and C++ and a monolithic software architecture that combines code with varied security expectations without isolation. To counter these critical issues, developers are migrating to memory-safe languages like OCaml and Rust and employing software compartmentalization techniques that reduce the attack surface. Current compartment schemes are designed specifically for C and C++, and do not accommodate language features found in high-level programming languages, such as exceptions, higher-order functions, tail-call optimisation, and garbage collection. Even with the advent of memory-safe languages, developers often rely on legacy third-party libraries written in C and C++, and this is unlikely to change in the near future. This requires re-imagining the compartment schemes to work seamlessly in the presence of both unsafe and safe language codes.

This paper proposes FIDES, a novel hardware-enabled compartment scheme designed for high-level, memory-safe, functional programming languages targeting resource-constrained embedded systems. FIDES creates code compartments with custom compiler and hardware extensions. It leverages the language-level safety guarantees of a memory-safe language to enforce fine-grained data sharing across compartments. FIDES' compartment scheme supports essential functional programming features like tail-call optimisation, higher-order functions and exceptions. To permit mixed-language applications, FIDES extends C with hardware-assisted fat pointers to preserve the guarantees of the compartment scheme. FIDES is realized by extending a RISC-V processor. We illustrate our technique by implementing FIDES to secure OCaml and C, mixed-language, MirageOS Unikernel applications and demonstrate a prototype on FPGA. Our results show that FIDES executes OCaml code with no additional performance penalty while the C code is secure but pays a small penalty to preserve the guarantees of the compartment scheme.

CCS Concepts: • **Security and privacy → Embedded systems security**; **Software security engineering**.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Memory Isolation, Privilege Separation, LLVM, Compartmentalization, OCaml, Unikernels, Fat pointers

1 Introduction

Cyber attacks have been rapidly increasing in recent years. While several factors contribute to this growth, two prominent causes are the widespread use of C and C++ and the monolithic design of applications. The lack of built-in memory safety in C and C++ can lead to critical security vulnerabilities, making these programming languages one of the most insecure [20, 50]. Monolithic software design that mixes code with different security guarantees in the same address space makes every vulnerability dangerous, potentially compromising the entire system. For example, a vulnerability in an image processing library like `libpng` (CVE-2020-35511 [39]) used by a banking application might be exploited by an attacker to compromise the entire application, leading to the loss of critical financial data. Even in a safe language, malicious third-party libraries from popular package ecosystems may steal sensitive data such as passwords and private keys [7, 8].

Two approaches often adopted to address these security problems are memory-safe programming languages and software compartments. Safe[1] languages, such as OCaml, Rust, Java, JavaScript and

[1]We write "safe" and "unsafe" languages to mean "memory-safe" and "memory-unsafe" languages, respectively.

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Python, rely on the compiler to guarantee the absence of memory safety vulnerabilities. Major open source projects, such as Linux [47] and Mozilla Firefox [36], are slowly transitioning towards safe programming languages. The other approach is software compartments [9, 15, 16, 25, 29, 30, 45, 55], which provide *intra-process* vulnerability isolation by partitioning software into isolated components where each component has just the required privileges to execute [44]. Compartments permit sensitive code to be isolated from the rest of the application, limiting the impact of a potential vulnerability in an unsafe language or a malicious third-party library [7, 8]. In a typical compartment scheme, each isolated component is defined by a code region called *code compartment* and a data region called *data compartment*. Access policies limit the control flow between functions to only those whitelisted and ensure that every memory access is within a predefined data compartment.

In practice, both methods encounter difficulties. The main obstacle in moving to a safer programming language is that large amounts of C/C++ code have been in use and working well for many years. An overnight transition to a safe language is, therefore, not practical. Organizations approach the shift gradually, progressively integrating a safer language into the application's existing codebase. This leads to applications that have safe languages mixed with unsafe C/C++ code in the same codebase. For example, the Firefox browser has around 40% C/Assembly/C++ code, 11% Rust code, and the remaining primarily consists of HTML and Javascript [35]. These mixed language codebases undermine the benefits of the safe language because of the memory vulnerabilities still present in the unsafe code [33].

As for software compartments, most schemes are designed specifically for C and C++ software. A key challenge is that the absence of memory safety in C/C++ makes the design of data compartments challenging. For example, sharing a data structure across two compartments can be done either by (a) relaxing the compartment policy so that both compartments can access the shared data or (b) copying the data from one compartment to the other. While the former results in larger attack surfaces, the latter increases overheads and modifies program semantics (sharing references versus copies). Furthermore, to share a data structure across two compartments and get the correct semantics, we would require the programmers to have knowledge of the compartment scheme. Hence, it is often impractical to modify legacy code to suit a bespoke compartmentalization scheme.

So far, the compartmentalization and the transition to safe programming languages have been viewed in isolation. We observe that we can merge both approaches, complementing each other to arrive at a more robust security model. We leverage the memory safety guarantees of safe language to simplify the compartment design. Intra-process compartments hold the promise of (a) isolating unsafe C/C++ code from safe code and (b) isolating untrusted third-party libraries from sensitive parts of the program. Designing such a pragmatic compartment scheme for safe languages, however, remains challenging due to the following reasons:

C1 Applications developed in safe languages often link with legacy C/C++ libraries. Vulnerabilities in C/C++ compromise the safety of the entire application. Therefore, any compartment scheme designed for safe languages should also accommodate the challenges of linking against C/C++.

C2 Higher-order functions (HoFs) and function closures are widely used in functional programming languages like OCaml and are becoming mainstream in languages like Python and Java. Current compartment schemes are too rigid and cannot handle them efficiently. For example, given that function closures may be allocated in one compartment and executed in another, care needs to be taken to accommodate both code and data compartmentalization of closures.

C3 High-level languages include language features (such as exceptions) and compilation techniques (such as tail call optimisation) that have complex control-flow characteristics. Extant compartmentalization techniques designed for C do not accommodate these features, making them unsuitable for high-level languages.

We propose Fides, a fine-grained compartment scheme that provides isolation at function-level granularity, designed for applications that use untrusted modules and mix safe and unsafe languages. In this work, we use OCaml as the safe language and C as the unsafe language. In addition to the source code, Fides requires a *policy file* that assigns functions to compartments, defines inter-compartment access policies, and specifies distinguished functions as valid entry points into compartments. All control flow within a compartment is unrestricted. However, any control flow between functions belonging to different compartments is allowed only if the access policy permits it and only through valid entry points. To efficiently enforce this at runtime, Fides uses hardware assistance.

For data compartments, prior work [45, 53] supports coarse-grained compartmentalization (often page granularity) due to reliance on OS. However, Fides achieves fine-grained data compartments at byte-level granularity by building on top of memory safety guarantees of the safe language. A type-safe OCaml program is memory-safe. Only data that is accessible to an OCaml function is what is transitively reachable from its locals, function arguments and globals. To ensure that this property is preserved for an application that mixes OCaml and C and to bring the same guarantees to C (challenge **C1**), Fides uses spatial and temporal memory safe C with hardware-assisted fat pointers [11, 37, 38, 54, 58].

To address **C2**, Fides introduces the notion of *fluid compartments* that facilitates flexible compartment strategies to securely share closures between compartments without compromising security. We design our compartment scheme to preserve tail-calls and support exceptions (challenge **C3**).

Our approach is developer-friendly. Apart from a few unsupported language features in the unsafe language (§2.1), Fides neither requires code changes nor changes the semantics of parameter passing for inter-compartment function calls. This allows us to readily use the large ecosystem of available libraries, including the MirageOS [32] library operating system. Fides allows compartment access policies to be defined separately from the source code. This permits an expert security engineer to compartmentalize an application which may include untrusted third-party code. Since our compartmentalization does not rely on OS or MMU, it is suitable for constrained embedded systems that support neither. Fides compiles OCaml- and C-based applications to run *baremetal* on a modified RISC-V [23] processor with two new instructions – (1) checkcap that enforces code compartments, and (2) val that enforces data compartments in C.

Our contributions are as follows:

- We present Fides, a fine-grained compartment scheme designed for applications that mix safe and unsafe language. Fides supports high-level language features such as HoFs, tail calls and exceptions.
- We present a formal operational model of Fides, inspired by RISC-V, to prove that Fides preserves the security guarantees provided by compartmentalization (§4).
- We present an implementation of Fides on a modified Shakti RISC-V processor [14] that executes baremetal MirageOS [32] unikernels (§5). Fides builds upon Shakti-MS [11], which provides spatial and temporal memory safety to C.
- We demonstrate the effectiveness of Fides with a security-critical electronic voting machine (EVM) application (§3). Our evaluation of Fides on the Xilinx Artix-7 AC701 FPGA [56] shows that Fides offers an attractive security-performance tradeoff (§6).

2 Threat model

In this section, we list the assumptions and limitations of Fides and describe the attack model.

Table 1. Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [10] that Fides mitigates or significantly weaken the damage

CWE	C+OCaml	Memory-safe C + OCaml	FIDES
Memory error based CWEs			
CWE-415: Double Free	◐	●	●
CWE-416: Use after free	◐	●	●
CWE-125: Out-of-bounds read	◐	●	●
CWE-787: Out-of-bounds write	◐	●	●
CWE-121: Stack-based buffer overflow	◐	●	●
CWE-124: Buffer underwrite (buffer underflow)	◐	●	●
CWE-123: Write-what-where condition	◐	●	●
CWE-122: Heap-based buffer overflow	◐	●	●
CWE-562: Return of stack variable address	◐	●	●
FFI interactions	○	●	●
Privilige isolation based CWEs			
CWE-653:Improper isolation or compartmentalization	○	○	●
CWE-250:Execution with unnecessary privileges	○	○	●
CWE-441:Unintended proxy or intermediary (confused deputy)	○	○	●
CWE-1125: Excessive attack surface	○	○	●
CWE-767: Access to critical private variable via public method	○	○	●
CWE-691: Insufficient control flow management	○	○	●

○ : not mitigated | ◐ : partially mitigated only in OCaml codebase | ● : Mitigated

2.1 Assumptions and limitations

Fides permits applications to be built with a mix of safe (OCaml) and unsafe (C) code. The application may contain malicious untrusted third-party libraries. The attacker has full knowledge of the internals of Fides, the application's source code and the compartment access policy. To support fat pointers, on the C side, Fides does not support casting integers to pointers, unions with pointer and variadic arguments. The application is compiled using the Fides OCaml and C compilers, which are assumed to be correct. Fides supports hand-written assembly, but we trust this code to be correct. We also assume correct any use of the `Obj` module in OCaml that permits unsafe access to the OCaml heap. We assume that the Fides executable, a statically linked binary, cannot be tampered with. Hardware- [26], fault- [5]and side-channel attacks [31] are beyond the scope of the model.

2.2 Attacks

Despite our assumptions and limitations, an application that mixes OCaml and C leaves open many attack vectors. Table 1 lists the major vulnerability classes present in a C + OCaml codebase.

2.2.1 Memory vulnerability. Since C does not offer memory safety, the C code can read and write to arbitrary parts of the OCaml heap and stack. Given that the attacker has full knowledge of the application's source code, they may craft an attack by writing to security-critical data in memory, leading to leaking information [48].

```
1 let admin_flag = ref false
2 ...
3 if (admin_flag) (* do privileged operation *)
```

In the code above, the attacker may use a memory error-based CWE (Table 1), to update `admin_flag` to `true` to perform privileged operations. Appendix A in the supplementary material presents the source code for an attack that uses an out-of-bounds write to update the `admin_flag`. Making C

memory safe helps thwart memory error-based CWEs. Fides thwarts this attack with the help of hardware-assisted fat pointers for C. Our implementation of Fides builds upon Shakti-MS [11], which provides spatial and temporal memory safety for C.

2.2.2 Isolation. Our aim is to build secure MirageOS unikernels [32] for embedded systems. Unikernels combine application and OS code into a single-address-space executable. In particular, MirageOS unikernels offer no privilege separation mechanisms such as user and kernel modes, process abstractions, etc. While OCaml provides strong abstraction boundaries through modules and signatures, these may be defeated by C code, even with memory safety and the assumption that pointers cannot be forged. One attack vector is function closures, which are represented as objects on the heap that contain the code pointer and the environment. For example, consider the snippet below.

```
value *callback_sum = caml_named_value("sum");
value *callback_leak = caml_named_value("leak");
Store_field (*callback_sum, 0, Field(*callback_leak, 0));
```

Here, the C code accesses OCaml callbacks named `sum` and `leak` and overwrites the code pointer in the `sum` closure with that of the `leak` function. Importantly, the write is within the bounds of the `sum` closure, and hence, spatial memory safety is not enough to prevent this attack. Any subsequent calls to `sum`, including on the OCaml side, will now be subverted to the `leak` function. Appendix B in the supplementary material shows the entire working example. Fides provides the compartment mechanism for specifying and restricting such unintended control flow in the program, helping prevent control flow subversion. We shall discuss the details of the mechanisms in the next section.

3 Case study: An EVM with Fides

In this section, we illustrate the power of Fides by implementing an electronic voting machine (EVM) application as a MirageOS unikernel.We also show how Fides addresses the challenges with supporting compartments in expressive high-level languages.

3.1 Securing the EVM with Fides

Our EVM is an offline, embedded device that only runs the EVM application. The machine has an electronic display that lists the candidates and uses physical buttons to accept inputs. For each voter, the software validates the voter ID against a stored list of IDs and verifies that a vote has not already been cast for that ID. The vote is then read, encrypted, and stored in the device. After all the votes are cast, the election official locks the EVM application from accepting further votes. On the counting day, the election official inputs their credentials to decrypt and count the votes. The encryption is performed using an AES implementation in C.

Our goal is to prevent invalid votes, double voting, and leaking votes before the counting day. We use Fides to secure the EVM application and achieve its security goals. Figure 1 shows the high-level design of the EVM application. We compartmentalize the application based on whether it requires an election official's credential to access stored votes. The six compartments, labelled **CP1** to **CP6**, are described in Table 2. We use Fides to ensure that the untrusted **helper** (**CP5**) compartment can neither access the votes table nor escalate to election official privilege. To this end, the security engineer defines the compartment access policy, represented as an access matrix in Figure 1, that does not allow **helper** (**CP5**) to call functions in any other compartment except the OCaml standard library in **CP6**. During runtime, the hardware



Table 2. Compartments in EVM

ID	Name	Description
CP1	main-menu	Handles main menu and drives the EVM application.
CP2	admin	All the code which requires election official privilege.
CP3	crypto	C implementation of cryptographic libraries with OCaml wrappers.
CP4	votes-handler	Performs voter validation. Reads the plaintext vote from the user, encrypts using the crypto library, and stores it in the memory-mapped `votes table`. Contains all code handling unencrypted votes. **Sensitive.**
CP5	helper	All code that neither deals with votes in plaintext nor requires election official privilege, such as the code for the helper menu, time module. Contains third-party libraries including C code. **Untrusted.**
CP6	ocaml-stdlib	OCaml standard library and the OCaml runtime.

monitors the control flow, and traps when it does not comply with the defined access policy.

3.1.1 Addressing challenge C1. Recall that Fides does not have an explicit data compartment but relies on the memory safety of the OCaml language and hardware-accelerated fat pointers for C code. In the EVM, the pointer to the `votes table` is defined with a local scope of **CP4**. To access the `votes table`, the attacker either has to exploit some memory vulnerability or should be able to invoke a function that has access to the `votes table`. The former is prevented by memory safety, and the latter by preventing the untrusted **CP5** from accessing **CP4**, either directly or transitively, with the help of the compartment access policy.

3.1.2 Addressing challenge C2. Defining code and data compartment policies for higher-order function closures is tricky. For example, consider the following code:

```
let res_tab = Array.make num_candidates 0 (* candidate_id -> num_votes *)
let count_votes votes_arr (* decrypted votes array *) =
  let inc_vote candidate_id =
    res_tab.(candidate_id) <- res_tab.(candidate_id) + 1
  in
  Array.iter inc_vote votes_arr
```

Listing 1. A partial listing of `vote_counting.ml` from EVM application

The code above belongs to the vote counting module in compartment **CP4**. The array `res_tab` is a table that contains the results of the election, mapping candidate IDs to the number of votes cast for this candidate. The counts are initialized to 0. Observe that the HoF `inc_vote` belongs to **CP4**, closes over data (`res_tab`) that belongs to **CP4**, but is invoked for every array element by `Array.iter`. The question is, which compartment should `Array.iter` be placed in so that (1) the security guarantees are preserved and (2) the execution is efficient. There are three options: (a) duplicate `Array.iter` in each compartment where it is used, (b) place `Array.iter` in the same

compartment as `inc_vote`, i.e. **CP4**, or (c) place `Array.iter` in the **CP6** compartment (with the rest of the OCaml standard library functions) and allow **CP6** to access **CP4**.

Standard library functions like `Array.iter` are pervasively used throughout the application. Duplicating them in every compartment is simple but inefficient (due to larger binary sizes and thus lowering instruction cache efficiency). Placing the `Array.iter` in **CP4** is insecure since every compartment that needs to access `Array.iter` will gain access to all of **CP4**. Placing `Array.iter` in a separate compartment, say **CP6**, may seem like the better choice in terms of security, but it is inefficient since every iteration of the array will need to switch from `Array.iter`'s compartment **CP6** to `inc_vote`'s compartment **CP4**. In addition, this scheme also opens up security issues since the compartment **CP6** is allowed access to **CP4**. All other compartments needing access to `Array.iter` should be allowed to access **CP6**. An attacker can misuse this scheme to stage a *confused deputy attack* [19] as shown on the left of Figure 2. The attacker in the untrusted **CP5** compartment can call `Array.iter` with `inc_vote` and a maliciously crafted `votes_arr` with forged votes, thereby updating the results table `res_tab`. Thus, none of the three options can securely handle HoFs. To securely and efficiently compartmentalize HoFs, FIDES introduces the notion of *fluid compartments*. A fluid compartment does not have a fixed compartment policy of its own but inherits the compartment access policy of its caller compartment. The policy on the right of Figure 2 shows **CP6** marked as a fluid compartment. When the attacker invokes `Array.iter` with `inc_vote` and a malicious `votes_arr`, `Array.iter` inherits the **CP5**'s access policy. Since **CP5** is not allowed to access **CP4**, the call to `inc_vote` fails. This prevents confused deputy attacks.



Fig. 2. **CP6** implemented as a normal compartment (Left) vs. a fluid compartment (right).

As we will see in later sections, switching compartments requires saving and restoring compartment-local context. Our results in §6 show that the cost of switching to a fluid compartment is closer to an intra-compartment call and is much cheaper than an inter-compartment call.

3.1.3 *Addressing challenge C3 with* FIDES.

Existing code compartment schemes only support typical call and return sequences. OCaml supports exceptions and tail-call optimisation, whose control flow is more complex than the typical function call and return sequence. Non-local control flow makes the implementation of code compartment schemes challenging.

Consider the example given in Figure 3. Before the machine is used for an election, its state must be reset. The function `init_election` resets the machine, preparing for the new election. As part of the procedure, it reseeds the random number generator (RNG). The function `process_action` in compartment **CP1** calls



Fig. 3. FIDES support for tail-calls across compartments. After the tail-call from **CP2** to **CP3**, FIDES ensures that control returns to **CP1** skipping **CP2**

Word-sized integer w		
Fat pointer fp	::=	$\langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p \rangle$
Base α	::=	w
Bound β	::=	w
Cookie κ	::=	w
Pointer p	::=	w
Values v	::=	$w \mid fp$
compartment ID cid	::=	$\mathbb{N}$

(a) Values

Integer registers r	::=	$r_0 \ldots r_{31}$
Fat pointer register fr		
Register R	::=	$r_i \mid fr$
Instructions i	::=	call r | tailcall r | return
	|	extcall r | callback r
	|	raise | pushtrap r | poptrap
	|	val r fr | load R r | store r R
	|	fatmalloc fr r | fatfree fr
	|	checkcap cid | push R | pop R

(b) Registers and Instructions

Fig. 4. Syntax

`init_election` in **CP2**, which in turn tail calls the function `reseed_rng` in **CP3** to reseed the RNG. The function `reseed_rng` returns to `process_action`, skipping `init_election` in the return path. As we will see in §4, whenever we switch compartments, the hardware saves and restores compartment state in a separate *security monitor* (SM) stack that is inaccessible by the user code. Our key observation is that, in the presence of tail calls, the hardware compartment scheme must be made aware of the semantics of tail calls so that the SM stack is appropriately unwound and maintained in sync with the program call stack. Otherwise, it would result in improper configuration of the compartment state, crashing the program.

A trivial solution is to disable tail-call optimisation completely. In OCaml, iteration is often written with tail recursion, with the guarantee that the tail recursion will be turned into a loop by the compiler. Disabling tail-call optimisation breaks this fundamental guarantee, and every tail recursive call will grow the stack, quickly leading to stack overflow. In our EVM application, disabling tail-call optimization crashes the application due to stack overflow. Also, supporting tail-call optimization allows Fides to support applications which were programmed explicitly with the intent of utilizing tail-call optimization. As we will see in §4, the same holds for exceptions, which unwinds the stack until the matching exception handler. Fides' code compartment scheme is extended to support tail calls and exceptions seamlessly.

4 Fides Formal Model

This section presents Fides' design with the help of formal operational semantics for a core language inspired by RISC-V. Using the model, we show how Fides' security guarantees are preserved.

Notations. We use v^* to represent an array of v's indexed by an integer. We use $\overline{v}$ for a list of values v, $x :: xs$ to represent a list with a head x and a tail xs, $l@l'$ to represent a list obtained by appending lists l and l', and [] for the empty list. We define $\text{trunc}(l, n)$ to be ls, where $l = lp@ls$ and $|ls| = n$. Intuitively, if the list l is used as a stack, $\text{trunc}(l, n)$ pops the stack until the length of the stack is n. We use $\emptyset$ for an empty map.

4.1 Syntax

Figure 4 presents the syntax of our core language. The values v in our language are either word-sized integers or pointers w or fat pointers fp. Fat pointers are only used in C and consists of 4 word-sized fields – base α and bound β used for spatial safety, a cookie k for temporal safety, and the memory pointer p. The compartment ID, cid, a natural number, uniquely identifies a compartment.

The machine has 32 integer registers r_i and a single fat pointer register fr. We assume that the Fides C and OCaml compilers target the instruction set i. The language includes instructions

Program P	::=	i^*	Compartment Map C	::=	$\emptyset \mid C[cid \mapsto (pc, pc)]$
Program counter pc	::=	w	Security monitor (SM) $\mathcal{S}$	::=	$\{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}$
Stack σ	::=	$\overline{v}$	SM stack $\sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$	::=	$\overline{(pc, cid)}$
Heap H	::=	w^*	Length of program stack l_{st}	::=	w
Register map ρ	::=	$\emptyset \mid \rho[R \mapsto v]$	Length of SM stack l_{smst}	::=	w
Access matrix $\mathcal{A}$	::=	$cid \times cid$	Exception stack σ_{exn}	::=	$\overline{(pc, \phi, l_{st}, l_{smst})}$
Current compartment ID ϕ	::=	cid	Program State Π	::=	$\lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn} \rceil$
Fluid compartment ϕ_f	::=	cid	Machine State $\sum$	::=	$\|\|P, \mathcal{S}, \Pi\|\|$

Fig. 5. Runtime structures

for indirect call and tailcall, and return. Instructions extcall and callback are part of the OCaml–C foreign function interface (FFI) to invoke C code from OCaml and vice versa, respectively. Instructions raise, pushtrap and poptrap are used for exceptions while load and store are used to access memory. The data compartments in C are enforced with the help of the val instruction, which validates the data access. The instructions fatmalloc and fatfree allocate and free memory in C. The checkcap instruction enforces code compartments. Instructions push and pop operate on the program stack. We assume but do not model the standard arithmetic and logical instructions.

4.2 Runtime structures

Figure 5 describes the runtime state of the machine. The program P is an array of instructions indexed by a word-sized program counter pc. The program stack σ is a list of values, and the heap H is an array of words. The stack is primarily used for spilling registers. All the objects are allocated on the heap. The register map ρ maps the registers to values.

The machine state Σ is a triple with the program P, the security monitor (SM) state $\mathcal{S}$ and the program state Π. The program state consists of those parts of the state that can be directly manipulated by the instructions. This includes the program counter pc, the heap H, the stack σ, the register map ρ and the exception stack σ_{exn}. The SM $\mathcal{S}$, which cannot be directly accessed by user code, consists of the current compartment ID ϕ, the SM stack $\sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$, the compartment map C and the access matrix $\mathcal{A}$. The compartment map C maps the compartment IDs to non-overlapping ranges of program counters. The access matrix $\mathcal{A}$ and the compartment map C are defined by an expert security engineer and does not change during the execution of the program.

FIDES' compiler assembles code such that functions mapped to the same compartment are placed adjacent to each other in the program. This lets us quickly check whether a pc belongs to a given compartment by performing range checks. The access matrix $\mathcal{A}$ is a binary relation on compartment IDs. If $(c_1, c_2) \in \mathcal{A}$, then a function in c_1 is allowed to call any function in c_2. We assume that there is a distinguished compartment ID ϕ_f for the fluid compartment. We defer the details of the exception stack σ_{exn} and SM stack $\sigma_{\mathcal{S}}$ to the rules that manipulate them.

4.3 Calling convention

Our formal model uses a simple calling convention inspired by RISC-V ABI, which is extended to support fat pointers. We assume that every function takes at most one integer and one pointer. The arguments are passed in registers. Given that fat pointers cannot be stored in an integer register, different language combinations use different argument registers. Table 3 presents the argument registers used in different combinations of languages.

When calling between C functions, the integer argument is passed in r_1 and the fat pointer in fr. OCaml does not use fat pointers, calls between OCaml functions uses $r1$ for integer

Table 3. Argument registers used in function calls.

Caller	Callee	r_1	r_2	fr
C	C	int	–	fat pointer
OCaml	OCaml	int	pointer	–
OCaml	C	int	pointer	fat pointer(r_2)
C	OCaml	int	pointer(fr)	fat pointer

argument and r_2 for the pointer. When calling C from OCaml, the pointer in r_2 is promoted to a fat pointer and passed in fr to the callee. Similarly, when calling from C to OCaml, the fat pointer in fr is demoted to a word-sized pointer and passed in r_2.

Like OCaml, all registers are caller-saved registers. The registers $r_3 \ldots r_{31}$ are temporaries. The set of temporary registers is indicated by R_{tmp}. During a call, the return address is saved in the r_0 register. For return values, OCaml returns both integer and pointer results in r_1, whereas C returns integers in r_1 and fat pointers in fr.

Note that these simplifications to the calling convention have only been made to the formal model. Fides implementation does not modify the C/OCaml ABI. We defer the details to later sections.

4.4 Operational Semantics

In this section, we present a small-step operational semantics for our core language. Every reduction step is of the form $\Sigma \rightarrow \Sigma'$ where the machine takes one step from state Σ to Σ'.

4.4.1 **Call and return instructions.** Figure 6 shows the semantics of call and return instructions. The rules with the prefix Comp in their names capture the semantics of inter-compartment control-flow transition whereas the other rules correspond to intra-compartment transitions. We use an auxiliary definition InCompto check whether a given pc value lies within a compartment boundary.

Definition 4.1 (Intra-compartment check). The intra-compartment check InComp is defined as $\textsc{InComp}(C, \phi, pc) = (pc >= \mathsf{fst}(C[\phi]) \ \wedge \ pc <= \mathsf{snd}(C[\phi])) \ \vee \ (pc >= \mathsf{fst}(C[\phi_f]) \ \wedge \ pc <= \mathsf{snd}(C[\phi_f]))$

Intuitively, $\textsc{InComp}(C, \phi, pc)$ holds when pc is either within the current compartment ϕ or is within the fluid compartment ϕ_f.

The rule Call shows the semantics of the call instruction for an intra-compartment call. The target program counter pc' is in the current compartment or belongs to the fluid compartment. If so, the program counter is updated to pc' and the return address register r_0 is set to $pc + 1$. As an aside, note that since all registers are caller-saved in the formal model, the compiler saves the return address register r_0 on the stack at the entry to a function and restores it before returning using the push and pop instructions. Intra-compartment tail call (rule TailCall) is similar to call, but it does not modify the return address register r_0. On an intra-compartment return (rule Return), we check that the return address is indeed in the current compartment or the fluid compartment. Then the program counter is updated to the address in the r_0 register.

The rule CompCall captures the semantics of inter-compartment call – the target program counter pc' is not in the current compartment ϕ or in the fluid compartment ϕ_f. We perform a couple of integrity checks to see whether this inter-compartment call is allowed. First, we check whether the instruction at the target program counter pc' is a checkcap ϕ' instruction, where ϕ' is the target compartment ID. Fides compiler inserts the checkcap instruction with the corresponding compartment ID at every compartment entry point. This serves the same purpose as *endbr* instruction in Intel's Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) [21], to protect against attacks such as return-oriented programming (ROP) and jump-oriented programming (JOP). If *endbr* is not found at the target of an indirect jump or call, then the processor traps, thwarting the attempted control-flow hijack. We model a similar behaviour by expecting checkcap instruction at the target of an inter-compartment call. Note that the checkcap instruction itself is a no-op (rule Checkcap). Finally, we check that the transition is permitted by the access matrix $(\phi, \phi') \in \mathcal{A}$.

CALL

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{call } r \qquad pc' = \rho[r] \qquad \textsc{InComp}(\mathcal{S}.C, \mathcal{S}.\phi, pc')}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho[r_0 \mapsto pc + 1], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

TAILCALL

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{tailcall } r \qquad pc' = \rho[r] \qquad \textsc{InComp}(\mathcal{S}.C, \mathcal{S}.\phi, pc')}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

RETURN

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{return} \qquad pc_{ret} = \rho[r_0] \qquad \textsc{InComp}(\mathcal{S}.C, \mathcal{S}.\phi, pc_{ret})}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc_{ret}, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

CHECKCAP

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{checkcap } \phi}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc + 1, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

COMPCALL

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{call } r \qquad pc' = \rho[r] \qquad \neg\, \textsc{InComp}(C, \phi, pc') \qquad P[pc'] = \text{checkcap } \phi' \qquad (\phi, \phi') \in \mathcal{A}}{\|P, \{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \{\phi', (pc + 1, \phi) :: \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho[r_0 \mapsto |P|][R_{tmp} \mapsto 0], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

COMPRETURN

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{return} \qquad \rho[r_0] = |P| \qquad (pc_{ret}, \phi') :: \sigma'_{\mathcal{S}} = \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}}{\|P, \{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \{\phi', \sigma'_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc_{ret}, H, \sigma, \rho[R_{tmp} \mapsto 0], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

COMPTAILCALL1

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{tailcall } r \qquad \rho[r_0] \neq |P| \qquad pc' = \rho[r] \qquad \neg\, \textsc{InComp}(C, \phi, pc') \qquad P[pc'] = \text{checkcap } \phi' \qquad (\phi, \phi') \in \mathcal{A}}{\|P, \{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \{\phi', (\rho[r_0], \phi) :: \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho[r_0 \mapsto |P|][R_{tmp} \mapsto 0], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

COMPTAILCALL2

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{tailcall } r \qquad \rho[r_0] = |P| \qquad pc' = \rho[r] \qquad \neg\, \textsc{InComp}(C, \phi, pc') \qquad P[pc'] = \text{checkcap } \phi' \qquad (\phi, \phi') \in \mathcal{A}}{\|P, \{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \{\phi', \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho[R_{tmp} \mapsto 0], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

Fig. 6. Semantics of calls and returns.

When the integrity checks hold, we transfer control to the target function in the new compartment. We update the compartment ID in the SM state $\mathcal{S}$ to the target compartment ϕ'. We push the return address and the current compartment ID to the SM stack. The program counter is updated to the target pc'. The return address register r_0 is set to a special program counter value $|P|$ outside the range of the program. Note that the program P is an array of instructions indexed by the program counter and hence the index $|P|$ lies outside of the program P. This special return address is used

to identify whether the control returns to another compartment on the return path. Saving the return address on the SM's private stack prevents an attacker-controlled callee compartment from returning to any arbitrary instruction in the caller's compartment. At most, an attacker can subvert control flow to some location within the current or fluid compartment but cannot enter other compartments. Finally, we also zero out all of the temporary registers $R_{tmp} = r_3 \ldots r_{31}$ to avoid leaking any information from the caller to the callee compartment.

The rule CompReturn models inter-compartment return, which is identified by the return address in r_0 being $|P|$. In this case, the SM stack is popped to get the previous compartment ID ϕ' and the return address pc_{ret}. The SM and program state are updated to the caller information. We also zero out the temporary registers to avoid leaking information across compartments.

The interaction of tail calls and compartments are interesting. Let us use the notation $f : \phi$ to indicate that the function f belongs to the compartment ϕ. The rule CompTailcall1 specifies the semantics of an inter-compartment tail call preceded by an intra-compartment call. For example, consider the calling sequence below:

$$f : \phi \xrightarrow{call} g : \phi' \xrightarrow{call} h : \phi' \xrightarrow{tailcall} i : \phi''$$

The rule specifies the behaviour of $h : \phi'$ calling $i : \phi''$. Importantly, due to the tail call, i must return to g. In the premise, we identify that the tail call has been preceded by an intra-compartment call since $\rho[r_0] \neq |P|$. The rest of the premises are the same as the inter-compartment call (rule CompCall). The only difference in the conclusion compared to the rule CompCall is that rather than $pc + 1$ being pushed onto the SM stack, since the call is a tail call, we push the return address of the caller $\rho[r_0]$. This ensures that control returns to the caller of the current function when the callee returns.

The rule CompTailcall2 specifies the semantics of an inter-compartment tail call preceded by an inter-compartment call, such as the calling sequence presented below:

$$f : \phi \xrightarrow{call} g : \phi' \xrightarrow{tailcall} i : \phi''$$

The rule specifies the behaviour of $g : \phi'$ calling $i : \phi''$. Here, $i : \phi''$ must return to $f : \phi$, skipping the function g and the compartment ϕ'. We know that the current function was entered through an inter-compartment call since the return address r_0 is $|P|$. The rest of the premises are the same as rule CompTailcall1. Importantly, in this case, we do not push an entry to the SM stack compared to CompTailcall1, which allows this compartment to be skipped on the return path. The rest of the conclusion is the same as CompTailcall1.

4.4.2 **Exceptions.** Similar to tail calls, OCaml exceptions also have interesting interactions with code compartments. When an exception is raised, in addition to unwinding the program stack, the machine also needs to unwind the SM stack. In the formal model, unlike OCaml, we assume that there is a unique, unnamed exception. Hence, raise does not take any parameter and unwinds the control to the closest matching handler. OCaml exception handlers are compiled to pushtrap and poptrap instructions, which delimit the exception handler scope. Let $[\![O]\!]$ represent the compilation of the OCaml program O to P. Then $[\![$ `try e with E ->...` $]\!]$ is defined as pushtrap r; $[\![e]\!]$; poptrap where r holds the program counter corresponding to the exception handler code $[\![$ `E ->...` $]\!]$.

The rule PushTrap shows the semantics of the push instruction. pushtrap r takes the register r that holds the program counter of the exception handler pc_{exn} as an argument. We check that the exception handler program counter pc_{exn} is indeed within the current compartment. If so, a new entry is pushed onto the exception handler stack σ_{exn}, with the exception handler program

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{pushtrap } r \qquad pc_{exn} = \rho[r] \qquad \textsc{InComp}(\mathcal{S}.C, \mathcal{S}.\phi, pc_{exn})}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma, \rho, (pc_{exn}, \mathcal{S}.\phi, |\sigma|, \mathcal{S}.|\sigma_{sm}|) :: \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|} \;\textsc{PushTrap}$$

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{poptrap} \qquad \_ :: \sigma'_{exn} = \sigma_{exn}}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma'_{exn}\rceil\|} \;\textsc{PopTrap}$$

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{raise} \qquad (pc_{exn}, \phi', l_{st}, l_{smst}) :: \sigma'_{exn} = \sigma_{exn} \qquad \sigma' = \text{trunc}(\sigma, l_{st}) \qquad \sigma'_{sm} = \text{trunc}(\sigma_{sm}, l_{smst})}{\|P, \{\phi, \sigma_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \{\phi', \sigma'_{\mathcal{S}}, C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc_{exn}, H, \sigma', \rho[R_{tmp} \mapsto 0], \sigma'_{exn}\rceil\|} \;\textsc{Raise}$$

Fig. 7. Semantics of the exceptions

counter pc_{exn}, the current compartment ID $\mathcal{S}.\phi$, and the lengths of the current program and SM stack. The latter two are used during raise to unwind the corresponding stacks.

The rule PopTrap simply pops the exception handler stack, thus removing the exception handler from the scope. When an exception is raised (rule Raise), we find the most recent exception handler information from the exception stack and truncate both the program stack and the SM stack to the length that they were at the point of installing the exception handler. Recall that $\text{trunc}(\sigma, n)$ pops elements from the stack σ until the length of the stack is n. Observe that raise permits throwing exceptions within and across the compartments. In the case of a cross-compartment exception, we had already validated that pc_{exn} is within the compartment ϕ' when the exception handler was installed (in pushtrap). On a raise, we also unconditionally reset all the temporary registers to 0 to prevent the possibility of information leaking across compartments through temporaries.

4.4.3 **Memory access.** Figure 8 presents the semantics of the memory access instructions. Unlike code compartments, Fides does not have explicit data compartments. Instead, it provides the guarantee that a function can only access the data that is transitively accessible from its locals, arguments and global data. This makes it easy to use HoFs which may close over data allocated in other compartments without worrying about the data compartments where the environment variables belong to. While OCaml ensures memory safety at the language level, C does not. Hence, we utilise a hardware-based fat pointer scheme, Shakti-MS [11], to ensure memory safety in the untrusted C dependencies. We extend the fat pointer scheme of Shakti-MS to accommodate mixed safe-and-unsafe language applications.

Rule FatMalloc presents the semantics of an allocation in C. The instruction fatmalloc takes the size of memory to allocate in words, and if successful, the resultant fat pointer is stored in the fr register. We assume a primitive malloc instruction that takes the size in words and returns a pointer to this allocated memory. Every allocation in the C heap includes a header that has a randomized cookie value for temporal safety. Note that in the antecedent, we request malloc to allocate a memory region 1 word larger than the original request. We also assume a primitive function rand that returns a random word. We use it to obtain a fresh cookie value k. The pointer returned p points to the word after the header. We update the heap such that the header word is set to the fresh cookie value and the rest of the fields in the newly allocated region are zero'ed out. In the conclusion of the rule, we update the fr register with the newly crafted fat pointer.

Rule Val presents the semantics of the val r fr instruction which validates a fat pointer fr, and if successful, returns the pointer value in r. The checks include the spatial checks to see whether

$$\textsc{FatMalloc}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{fatmalloc } fr\ r \qquad sz = \rho[r] \qquad \alpha = \text{malloc}(sz+1) \qquad \kappa = \text{rand}() \qquad p = \alpha + 1 \qquad \beta = \alpha + sz + 1 \qquad H' = H[\alpha \mapsto \kappa][(\alpha+1)\ldots(\alpha+sz) \mapsto 0]}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H', \sigma, \rho[fr \mapsto \langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p\rangle], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{FatFree}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{fatfree } fr \qquad \langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p\rangle = \rho[fr] \qquad \text{free}(\alpha) \qquad \kappa' = \text{rand}()}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H[\alpha \mapsto \kappa'], \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{Val}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{val } r\ fr \qquad \langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p\rangle = \rho[fr] \qquad p > \alpha \qquad p < \beta \qquad (H[\alpha] = \kappa \vee \kappa = 0)}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma, \rho[r \mapsto p], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{LoadW}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{load } r_d\ r_a \qquad a = \rho[r_a]}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma, \rho[r_d \mapsto H[a]], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{StoreW}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{store } r_a\ r_v \qquad a = \rho[r_a]}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H[a \mapsto \rho[r_v]], \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{LoadFP}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{load } fr\ r \qquad a = \rho[r]}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma, \rho[fr \mapsto \langle H[a], H[a+1], H[a+2], H[a+3]\rangle], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{StoreFP}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{store } r\ fr \qquad \langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p\rangle = \rho[fr] \qquad a = \rho[r]}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \rightarrow \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H[a \mapsto \alpha][a+1 \mapsto \beta][a+1 \mapsto \kappa][a+3 \mapsto p], \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

Fig. 8. Semantics of memory access intructions

the pointer is within the base and the bound, and the temporal check to see whether the cookie k matches the cookie in the header of the memory region. We also permit the cookie in the fat pointer to be 0. This allows C code to access objects on the OCaml heap. A fat pointer with zero cookie is only crafted during an external call when pointers to OCaml objects are shared with C. We defer the details of this to the semantics of the extcall instruction. If the validation is successful, the register r is updated to have the pointer value p. Before loading from, storing to, freeing and passing a fat pointer from C to OCaml, the compiler inserts val instruction to check its validity.

Rule FatFree describes the semantics of freeing memory in C. The fatfree instruction uses the primitive free instruction to return memory back to the operating system. The header of the freed memory region is set to a fresh cookie value to prevent use-after-free issues. As mentioned earlier, since fatfree was preceded by the val instruction, double-free issues are impossible as the cookie validation will fail for the second fatfree. Note that the OCaml allocator and the garbage collector directly utilise the primitive malloc and free.

Rule LoadW describes the semantics of load r_d r_a. The rule is straightforward, it updates the destination register (r_d) with the value from the heap address pointed by register r_a. Note that

$$\textsc{Extcall}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{extcall } r \qquad p = \rho[r_2] \qquad l_{obj} = \text{objlen}(p) \qquad \|P[pc \mapsto \text{call } r], \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \;\rightarrow\; \|P', \mathcal{S}', \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho', \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \quad\rightarrow\quad \|P, \mathcal{S}', \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho'[fr \mapsto \langle p-1, p+l_{obj}, 0, p\rangle][r_2 \mapsto 0], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

$$\textsc{Callback}\quad \frac{P[pc] = \text{callback } r \qquad \langle \alpha, \beta, \kappa, p\rangle = \rho[fr] \qquad \kappa = 0 \qquad \|P[pc \mapsto \text{call } r], \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \;\rightarrow\; \|P', \mathcal{S}', \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho', \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \quad\rightarrow\quad \|P, \mathcal{S}', \lceil pc', H, \sigma, \rho'[r_2 \mapsto p][fr \mapsto \langle 0,0,0,0\rangle], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|}$$

Fig. 9. Semantics of the foreign function interface.

this instruction is used by OCaml for loading integers and pointers, but C only uses them to load integers. For (fat) pointers in C, rule LoadFP applies. Here the destination register is the fat pointer register fr. load fr r loads 4 consecutive words from the memory address pointed to by r and loads that in fr. The rules StoreW and StoreFP are duals of the load instruction.

It is useful to see how these instructions are used by the C compiler. Consider the following C code: `intptr_t *p; ...; v = *p`. For `*p`, the Fides C compiler generates val r_x fr; load r_y r_x. The fat pointer corresponding to p will be in the fr register. Using the val instruction, we extract the pointer in r_x register. Since the data pointed by r_x to is an integer, the destination register r_y in the load is an integer register. Now consider the following C code: `intptr_t **p; ...; v = *p`. For `*p`, the Fides C compiler generates val r_x fr; load fr r_x. Unlike the previous example, the data pointed to by r_x is a fat pointer. Hence, the destination of the load is the fat pointer register fr. As shown in rule LoadFP, this load instruction loads 4 consecutive words from the address pointed to by r_x.

4.4.4 **Foreign function interface.** The rules in Figure 9 describe the semantics of the FFI between OCaml and C. They broadly behave similarly to the call instruction. In fact, we use the reduction step for the call instruction to describe the semantics of foreign function calls. The main challenge here is the translation of pointer arguments when passed from OCaml to C and vice versa.

Rule Extcall describes the semantics of extcall instruction that calls a C function from OCaml. As described in §4.3, OCaml functions pass the integers in $r1$ and pointers in $r2$. The pointer in $r2$ must be translated to a fat pointer to pass to the C function. We can do this thanks to the fact that OCaml object headers encode the object length. We assume a primitive objlen function that returns the object length. Using the pointer and the object length, we craft a fat pointer with the cookie value 0 as described in §4.4.3.

Rule Callback describes the semantics of callback instruction that calls an OCaml function from C. In this case, on the caller (C) side, r_1 holds the integer argument, and fr holds the pointer argument. OCaml can only work with memory allocated in the OCaml heap and not the C heap. Hence, the only valid pointer that can be passed from C to OCaml is a pointer to an object in the OCaml heap. Fat pointers to OCaml objects will have 0 for the cookie field. As before, the reduction step uses the reduction step for call instruction and then updates r_2 to the pointer value p and fr to the NULL fat pointer.

4.4.5 **Semantics of stack manipulation.** Figure 10 presents the semantics of push and pop instructions, whose semantics is straightforward.

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{push } R}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \quad \rightarrow \quad \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \rho[R] :: \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|} \text{ PUSH}$$

$$\frac{P[pc] = \text{pop } R \qquad v :: \sigma' = \sigma}{\|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc, H, \sigma, \rho, \sigma_{exn}\rceil\| \quad \rightarrow \quad \|P, \mathcal{S}, \lceil pc+1, H, \sigma', \rho[R \mapsto v], \sigma_{exn}\rceil\|} \text{ POP}$$

Fig. 10. Semantics of push and pop instructions.

4.5 Safety

In this section, we show how the safety guarantees of the compartment scheme are preserved in the operational semantics. Let us start with a few definitions.

Definition 4.2 (Well-formed compartment map). Given a program P and a compartment map C, we say that the compartment map is well-formed if the following conditions hold:

- $\forall (s, e) \in \text{range}(C), 0 <= s <= e < |P|$. The compartment ranges are bounded by the program size, and the end of the compartment range does not precede the start.
- $\forall (s, e), (s', e') \in \text{range}(C), s < s' \implies e < s'$. That is, the compartment ranges are non-overlapping.
- $\forall (s, e) \in \text{range}(C), P[e] = \text{return}$. The last instruction in a compartment is a return instruction. Hence, functions do not span multiple compartments.

Definition 4.3 (Safe machine state). Given a machine state $\Sigma = \|P, \mathcal{S}, \Pi\|$, we say that the machine state is safe (written safe(Σ)) if InComp($\mathcal{S}.C, \mathcal{S}.\phi, \Pi.pc$) holds.

Intuitively, we say that a machine is safe if the pc is within the current compartment boundary.

Definition 4.4 (Initial machine state). Given a program P, a well-formed compartment info C, and access matrix $\mathcal{A}$, the starting program counter pc, the initial compartment ϕ, the initial machine state is defined as follows $\Sigma_0 = \|P, \{\phi, [], C, \mathcal{A}\}, \lceil pc, \emptyset, [], \emptyset, \emptyset\rceil\|$.

THEOREM 4.5 (COMPARTMENT SAFETY). *Given a safe initial machine state Σ_0, where safe(Σ_0) holds, if $\Sigma_0 \rightarrow^* \Sigma$, then safe($\Sigma$) holds.*

Proof sketch. The proof is by induction on the length of the trace. The base case is safe by definition. For the inductive case, the interesting instructions are those that change compartments.

- Inter-compartment call and tail call instructions (Figure 6) utilise the target compartment information ϕ', which is inserted by the compiler and known to be safe.
- For returning across compartments (rule CompReturn in Figure 6), we need to show that pc_{ret} is in ϕ'. The return address pc_{ret} was pushed onto the SM stack by the inter-compartment call (rule CompCall). In rule CompCall, we know pc+1 also belongs to the current compartment ϕ because call cannot be the last instruction; since the compartment map C is well-formed, the last instruction in the compartment is a return instruction.
- Raising an exception can change compartments (rule Raise in Figure 7). But the target pc_{exn} is guaranteed to be in ϕ' since the validation was done in PushTrap when the exception stack entry was pushed into the exception stack □.

5 FIDES Implementation

We instantiate FIDES in the Shakti open-source RISC-V processor [14]. Currently, FIDES supports OCaml and C and is designed to run Mirage unikernels[32]. MirageOS is a clean-slate unikernel

containing a mix of OCaml and C, making it suitable for evaluating Fides on resource-constrained embedded systems. We extend the MirageOS backend to execute on baremetal RISC-V [23] processors. This section explains the hardware and software stack of Fides.

5.1 Hardware changes

5.1.1 **Code compartments.** Currently, Fides supports 256 compartments. We add one custom instruction, checkcap, to the RISC-V ISA. The processor expects this instruction to be present at all valid compartment entry points.



Fig. 11. Fluid compartment types

Restricted fluid compartment. As we have seen earlier (§3.1.2), Fides introduces a fluid compartment to compartmentalize HoFs in an efficient and secure way. There are other first-order functions, such as string manipulation functions (`strcpy`), which may presumably be placed in a fluid compartment for all the compartments to access. Since the fluid compartment functions inherit the caller compartment's privileges, they can access all the compartments that the caller compartment can access. However, this privilege is unnecessary; string manipulation functions are typically self-contained and do not call other functions.

Worse, this can lead to exploits. Consider the case in the EVM application shown on the left of Figure 11. The function `update_display`, mapped to **admin** compartment (**CP2**), shows the ballot paper on the display. This invokes `strcpy` function to produce the output on the display. `strcpy` is mapped to **CP6** compartment. Since **CP6** is a fluid compartment, it can invoke **crypto** compartment (**CP3**) via the access policy it inherited from **CP2**. Any vulnerability present within `strcpy` function can be exploited by an attacker who can misuse this over-privilege to redirect control to the **crypto** compartment and manipulate sensitive cryptographic states. By restricting the privilege of **CP6** further, we can eliminate this attack vector.

To this end, Fides also supports a *restricted* fluid compartment that can only call functions in the caller compartment. The choice to allow calls to the caller compartment is to permit higher-order callbacks, which are pervasive in OCaml. The compartment scheme presented in the formal model in §4 is termed as a *complete* fluid compartment. Observe that when **CP6** is marked as a restricted fluid compartment (RHS of Figure 11), `strcpy` can no longer access the crypto compartment.

Compartment checks. The current compartment and the *pc* ranges of the two fluid compartments are maintained in RISC-V custom control and status registers (CSRs) [23] for fast access. All these CSRs are protected and can be accessed only by the SM.

The processor pipeline is modified such that on every instruction, the *pc* is checked to see whether it is within the boundary of the current or the fluid compartments. If not, the execution traps to the SM. The SM validates the transition against the access matrix and, if allowed, updates the compartment context and switches compartments. Note that this differs from the formal model, which performs the checks only on control-flow instructions. By performing the checks on every

instruction, our hardware provides stronger guarantees. For example, we do not need to assume that the compartments end with a return instruction; if it does not, the execution traps. Due to the pipelined nature of the check, checking on every instruction does not affect the processor's critical path and the processor's clock cycle count is not affected.

5.1.2 **Data compartments.** To support data compartments in C, hardware-assisted fat pointers [11] are used. The hardware and ISA are extended to support a new val instruction. The compiler inserts val instruction before dereferencing a fat pointer to enforce fine-grained spatial and temporal memory safety. Unlike the formal model, Fides does not extend the hardware with a fat pointer register. Instead, use multiple integer registers to hold the fat pointer value in the register map. Our implementation, being targeted at small embedded systems, assumes a 32-bit address space but runs on 64-bit RISC-V hardware. This allows us to pack the 4 (32-bit) fields of the fat pointer into 2 (64-bit) integer registers. The instructions fatmalloc and fatfree, present in the formal model, are implemented as wrappers of malloc and free.

5.2 Software Changes

5.2.1 **Code compartments.** Maintaining a separate compartment mapping file is based on the industry-best standard approach of offloading the security-critical task of assigning compartments to a security engineer [9]. For every source code file in the application, Fides expects a `.cap` file provided at compile time. For each function in a source code file, the corresponding `.cap` file contains the compartment ID for the function and a flag indicating whether the function is a valid entry point into the compartment. For example, in the code below,

```
<function>:<compartment ID>:<external>
count_votes : CP4 : ENTRY_POINT
inc_vote    : CP4 : NO_ENTRY_POINT
```

`inc_vote`, mapped to **CP4**, is not a compartment entry point and can only be used within **CP4** or the fluid compartments. The Fides compiler also accepts a default compartment ID to which all the functions which have not been explicitly assigned a compartment ID is assigned to. Fides OCaml and C compiler emits a checkcap instruction as the first instruction in each function that is tagged as a valid compartment entry point. A custom linker script is used to place all functions belonging to the same compartment in the same code section in the ELF generated. The SM derives the compartment boundary information at boot time by inspecting the ELF code sections. The SM code is placed in a reserved compartment.

The key task of the SM is to enforce the compartment access policy on all inter-compartment calls and returns. The SM executes with interrupts disabled, saves and restores compartment context on every compartment switch, and configures the CSRs on every compartment switch with appropriate compartment context. In the formal model, we build upon a calling convention, where it is assumed that all registers are caller-saved. However, the RISC-V C ABI includes callee-saved registers (`s0-s11`). On an inter-compartment C call, the caller does not trust the callee to not tamper with the callee-saved registers. Hence, the SM saves and restores callee-saved registers. OCaml does not follow the RISC-V ABI and does not have callee-saved registers. Hence, the SM does not save and restore registers on an inter-compartment OCaml call.

OCaml's garbage collection (GC) procedure scans the stack at the start of a GC to find the roots. OCaml uses the return address pushed onto the stack to identify GC roots in an activation frame. However, as seen in the formal model, Fides changes the return address on an inter-compartment call to a known constant canary value. This interferes with GC stack scanning. To get around this issue, Fides uses a shadow stack into which a copy of the original return address is pushed during

an inter-compartment call. When the GC stack scanning procedure encounters a canary value, it consults the shadow stack to retrieve the original return address and continues scanning the stack.

5.2.2 **Data compartments.** To instrument C code with fat pointer checks, we modify the LLVM RISC-V backend to introduce a fat pointer transformation pass similar to Shakti-MS [11]. The fat pointer transformation pass (i) identifies all pointer allocations to stack, heap and global data regions and transforms them into fat pointers, (ii) inserts instructions at allocation points so that the fat pointer fields – base, bound and cookie – are populated, and (iii) inserts fat pointer validation val instruction before every fat pointer dereference.

In the formal model, we assume that all allocations happen on the heap. However, local allocations on the stack are standard in C. To ensure memory safety for stack allocations, we extend the fat pointer instrumentation to the program stack. For spatial safety, the base and bound of pointers into the stack are set to the base and bound of the stack frame. We admit that this is more coarse-grained than the object-level spatial safety that we have for heap allocations. With a pointer to a value on the stack memory location in that stack frame may be modified. However, this provides a good balance between performance and security. For temporal safety, each stack frame also includes a cookie value that is set to a fresh value when the function is entered and exited. This ensures that pointers into the stack are only valid when the frame that the pointer points to is currently active.

The OCaml runtime, implemented in C, is part of the trusted computing base (TCB) and is not compiled with the fat pointer instrumentation. The Fides C instrumentation does not handle inline assembly automatically. We manually modify the inline assembly code to be aware of fat pointers and insert checkcap instructions at the function entry when necessary. Notably, the cost to do this is directly proportional to the size of the inline assembly code, which is expected to be small in real-world C libraries.

6 Results

6.1 Engineering effort

Fides extends LLVM version 11.1 and OCaml version 4.11.1 to add support for code compartments and memory safety in C. The changes to the OCaml compiler to support code compartments include 50 lines of code (LoC) in the RISC-V backend, 149 LoC in the frontend to handle `.cap` files, and 20 LoC in the GC to handle stack scanning using shadow stack. The changes to the LLVM backend and frontend to support code compartments are 155 and 37 LoC, respectively. The compartment description language allows a default compartment id to be specified for the functions in a given module. We have also extended the OCaml and C compiler and the dune and ocamlbuild build systems to support default compartment specification at the file and OCaml package level. The Shakti-MS fat pointer instrumentation pass in LLVM, which we build upon, consists of 2165 LoC. Observe that implementing Fides only requires minimal self-contained additions to the compilers.

Fides is realized on a Xilinx Artix-7 AC701 FPGA [56] with a default synthesis strategy. The baseline RISC-V core [14] consumes 36.0K look-up tables (LUTs) and 16.4K registers on the FPGA. The core with only support for fat pointers requires 36.3K LUTs and 16.5K registers, whereas the one with both fat pointers and code compartments requires 38.2K LUTs (+6.1%) and 17.4K LUTs (+6.0%). Importantly, the core's operating frequency is not affected by any of the modifications introduced by Fides.

6.2 Microbenchmark

To quantify the overheads of compartmentalizing higher-order functions, we pick a simple program: `let f i v = arr.(i) <- v + 1 in Array.iteri f arr`, and evaluate 4 different compartmentalization schemes: (i) `f` and `Array.iteri` are in the same compartment (baseline), (ii) `Array.iteri` is



Fig. 12. Execution time (clock cycles) overhead w.r.t C baseline. Number of compartment transitions specified in parentheses.

placed in a restricted fluid compartment, (iii) `Array.iteri` is placed in a complete fluid compartment, and (iv) `f` and `Array.iteri` are placed in different compartments. The program is reminiscent of the example discussed in §3.1.2. The array `arr` has 100,000 elements in our benchmark run. We observe that placing `f` and `Array.iteri` in the same compartment takes 90M clock cycles. Whereas, placing `Array.iteri` in one of the fluid compartments, the program takes the same clock cycles as the baseline. This is because of the fact that the fluid compartment check is not in the critical path of the execution and does not affect the clock cycle. However, when `Array.iteri` in a different compartment, we see a 5.4× increase in the clock cycle count compared to the baseline. The overhead is high here since the work done by the HoF is far less than the overhead of saving and restoring the compartment context. Given that HoFs such as `Array.iteri` are pervasive in OCaml, fluid compartments prove to be essential to keep the performance overheads of code compartment scheme low. Moreover, as discussed in §3.1.2, fluid compartments avoid the confused deputy problem when `Array.iteri` is placed in a different compartment.

6.3 Larger benchmarks

In this section, we quantify the following: (a) What is the cost of supporting code compartments? and (b) What is the cost of data compartments in OCaml compared to C hardened with fat pointers? Figure 12 shows the clock cycle overhead of enabling code and data compartments with respect to the C baseline. Columns marked C and OCaml denote the baseline executables with fat pointer and compartment checks disabled. All the microbenchmarks are taken from the computer language benchmarks game [49], except qsort, dijkstra and crc32, which were developed by us. mandelbrot and fasta are I/O intensive benchmarks, with mandelbrot containing negligible pointer operations.

6.3.1 **Cost of supporting code compartments.** We placed commonly invoked functions in different compartments to understand the overheads of enabling code compartments. For a fair comparison, we ensured that the number of compartment transitions remained the same in the C and OCaml programs for a given benchmark. In Figure 12, columns marked C + Code comp and OCaml + Code comp denote C and OCaml executables enabled with code compartments, respectively. We can see that the overhead of compartments is low compared to the microbenchmark in the previous section. On average, there is only a 10% increase in execution time when code compartments in OCaml and C are enabled compared to when compartments are not enabled in the respective languages. Overall, we can see that the overhead FIDES code compartments is low.

The SM stack is used to save and restore the compartment metadata. For inter-compartment C functions, we also save and restore the callee saved registers (as we do not trust the callee to preserve the registers). This adds upto 160 bytes, including the metadata, saved for inter-compartment calls from C. Since OCaml does not have callee saved registers, an inter-compartment call from OCaml saves 64 bytes on the SM stack. OCaml maintains exception handlers as part of the program stack.

Unlike the formal model, FIDES also maintains OCaml exception handlers the same way OCaml maintains them and does not use a separate exception stack.

6.3.2 **Cost of supporting data compartments.** Most of the performance overhead in FIDES is due to the data compartments. This is observed in columns marked C + Fat + Code comp and OCaml + Code comp in Figure 12. In the C version of qsort and crc32, there is a 6× and 19× slowdown (resp.) compared to the C baseline. Interestingly, the OCaml version with compartments enabled is slower on qsort and faster on crc32 compared to the C version with compartments and fat pointers. The choice to switch from an unsafe language like C to a safe language like OCaml is a complex choice that balances many, often conflicting, requirements such as performance, cost of transition, maintainability, richness of the library ecosystem, etc. The qsort result shows that, with FIDES, developers can retain certain parts of the program in C while gaining additional safety and security guarantees, whereas the crc32 result shows that there is, in fact, a clear win in terms of performance when switching to OCaml from C.

6.3.3 **Code size impact.** FIDES instruments the program with two new instructions – checkcap and val. We observed that the introduction of new instructions has a minimal impact on code size. The code size increase is only 4% in C and 2% in OCaml on the benchmark programs in Figure 12.

6.4 Evaluating the EVM application

Our technique scales to real-world applications with significant use of third-party libraries. The EVM application is constructed using 20 existing third-party packages from the MirageOS ecosystem, including mirage-crypto, lwt, etc. In total, it has 68k lines of code (LoC), out of which we wrote 5k lines of new code. 48% of the codebase is in OCaml. MirageOS itself depends on 29K LoC C code, majority of which is the OCaml runtime (21K LoC). We place the core OCaml runtime in a complete fluid compartment. Commonly used functions like `strcpy`, are placed in a restricted fluid compartment, sandboxing them completely. Access to device-specific functions like `printf`, are restricted to only the required compartments. For the 68k LoC EVM application, the .cap files and flags in the build scripts specifying the access matrix is 70 LoC. In practice, these annotations specify compartment entry points and compartment IDs.

Table 4. EVM case study with different compartment (comp) strategies. The baseline is the EVM application without FIDES.

# Comp.	Overhead (cycles)	Avg code size / comp (KB)	# Inter-comp trans ($\times 10^4$)
6:NF	1.59×	132	5170
6:F	1.23×	132	5
23:NF	1.60×	47	5320
23:F	1.23×	47	8

Some OCaml libraries do use `unsafe_*` functions. In the EVM application, seven libraries used unsafe features. While the `unsafe_*` functions could be replaced by their safe counterparts, in our EVM application, we did not restrict the use of these functions. Instead, we manually audited the unsafe features for correctness. We are able to support vast majority of C code out of the box. There were minor uses of inline assembly in the device drivers (30 LoC), which, required manual instrumentation. We don't support variadic arguments, and these were present in the `nolibc` library.

We evaluate the overheads of the EVM application with six compartments described in §3. Additionally, we evaluate the same application with another strategy that has 23 compartments, with each OCaml package placed in a different compartment. Further, each compartment strategy is evaluated with (F) and without (NF) fluid compartments.

Table 4 presents the results. Compared to the insecure baseline, FIDES EVM application has 23% overhead in the case of 6:F compartment. Without fluid compartments, the number of inter-compartment transitions increases significantly, which has a corresponding performance drop. When the application is compartmentalized in a fine-grained manner (23 compartments), we

observe that the average compartment code size reduces from 132KB to 47KB. This represents a significantly smaller attack surface and, thus, a more secure application. Interestingly, with fine-grained compartments, the number of transitions does not increase significantly, indicating that logically separate parts of the program have been placed in separate compartments. As a result, the performance remains almost the same. This illustrates that if a security engineer puts in the effort to compartmentalize the application in a fine-grained fashion, then not only is the security improved due to a smaller attack surface, but the performance impact also does not increase significantly compared to coarse-grained compartmentalization. The results also show that fluid compartments play a significant role in keeping the overheads low and providing better security by avoiding the confused deputy attack.

7 Related work

Intra-process compartment techniques have been widely studied over the years. Table 5 compares the recent solutions with respect to their support for safe languages, application in resource-constrained environments, compartment granularity, and sharing data between compartments.

Enforcing compartments. Donky [45], Enclosures [15] tag pages with compartment IDs. Enclosures uses Intel MPK [21]. Donky extends a similar scheme on RISC-V processors. SeCage [30] uses Intel VT-x [52] to enforce isolation between compartments, by setting up separate page tables for each compartment. CETIS [55] utilizes Intel CET [21] to support two compartments, while Glamdring [29] and GOTEE [16] utilize Intel SGX [22] to achieve the same. All the works discussed above require paging and MMU support. This restricts their applicability in resource-constrained embedded systems which lack paging support. Fides does not rely on the OS/hypervisor to enforce compartments, which makes it ideal for memory-constrained baremetal systems. Similar to Fides, ACES [9] and MINION [25] do not rely on paging support, and use ARM MPU [4].

Capability-based approaches, such as CHERI [54], do not require paging support. They transform every pointer into architectural capabilities to define compartment regions and enforce isolation between them. Compared to Fides fat pointer scheme, CHERI capabilities are more expressive, as they store extra permission bits (like `rwx`), apart from just base and bounds metadata. These permission bits restrict the operations that can be performed using that capability. Contrary to CHERI, our goal while developing Fides was to introduce minimal changes to the ISA without affecting the function call and data passing semantics, leveraging the safe language guarantees, thereby making it easier and more straightforward to port a mixed-language application to Fides.

Support for safe languages. Galeed [43] and PKRU-Safe [27] utilize Intel-MPK to secure Rust from C/C++ by splitting the application into two domains. They do not support compartments within Rust or C/C++ codebase. GOTEE [16] supports compartments in the Go language using Intel SGX. Enclosures [15] provides package-based isolation in Go and Python. All these techniques rely on paging support, restricting their applicability to embedded systems. CHERI-JNI [6] utilizes CHERI capabilities to secure the Java Native Interface [41] but does not support compartments within the Java code. CHERI supports the Rust [46] language but is yet to be ported to garbage-collected languages like

Table 5. Summary of hardware-assisted compartment solutions.
✗/✓: partial support. †: support multiple compartments within C. **F1**: Max. number of compartments. Support for **F2**: baremetal systems. **F3**: safe languages. **F4**: fine-grained compartments. **F5**: direct access to shared data.

Technique	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5
Secage[30]	512	✗	✗	✗	✗
Glamdring[29]	2	✗	✗	✗	✗
GOTEE[16]	2	✗	✓	✗	✗
Donky[45]	∞	✗	✗	✗	✗
Enclosures[15]	∞	✗	✓	✗	✗
PKRU-Safe[27]	2	✗	✗/✓	✗	✗
Galeed[43]	2	✗	✗/✓	✗	✗
CHERI-JNI[6]	$2^{\dagger}$	-	✗/✓	✗/✓	✓
ACES[9]	∞	✓	✗	✗	✗
MINION[25]	∞	✓	✗	✗	✗
CompartOS[3]	2^{64}	✓	✗	✓	✓
Fides	256	✓	✓	✓	✓

OCaml. Fides extensions to the OCaml compiler are lightweight §6.1 and do not require extensive changes to the compiler backend.

Support for fine-grained compartments. The compartment granularity defines the attack surface reduction. Intel-MPK supports 16 compartments and, requires software multiplexing to support more compartments, which incurs overheads [17, 42]. ACES [9] does not support fine-grained compartments, as the number of regions a compartment can access is limited based on the MPU register count (currently 16) and alignment constraints. This makes MPU-based techniques unsuitable for protecting multiple separated regions. Fides supports fine-grained compartments, which reduces attack surface significantly.

Support for direct access to shared data across compartments. Supporting secure direct data sharing between compartments is critical for performance. Paging-based solutions require OS intervention to tag pages with the same domain ID for sharing between compartments. MPU-based techniques support a limited number of shared regions, restricted by the number of isolated memory regions that can be defined. GOTEE [16] and Glamdring [29] require deep copying to share data between compartments, changing the semantics of the inter-compartment function calls. Fides utilizes safe language guarantees and hardware-assisted fat pointers to enforce secure direct data sharing between compartments.

Support for memory safety in C. Fides builds upon Shakti-MS [11] to enforce memory safety. Fides does not aim to optimise Shakti-MS or propose new memory safety techniques in C. Such optimisations are orthogonal to Fides. Unlike Shakti-MS, we present a formal model of the fat pointer scheme in this paper. There are many extant works that aim to enforce spatial and temporal memory safety. CCured [38] enforces spatial memory safety by introducing a fat pointer into the language's type system. Delta Pointers [28] and Low-Fat [12] ensure the same by encoding the bounds metadata within the pointer using compact encoding schemes. SoftboundCETS [37] achieves spatial and temporal memory safety by associating every pointer with disjoint bounds and liveness metadata. Checked-C [13, 58] achieves both spatial and temporal memory safety with the same fat pointer size as CCured has. MarkUs [1] and Dieharder [40] enforce temporal memory safety by ensuring that a freed memory region is not immediately reallocated, resulting in significant memory overheads, making them impractical for resource-constrained environments.

Formal semantics of compartments. In §4, we formalise the semantics of compartments in the presence of tail-calls, HoFs and exceptions, and memory safety in a multi-language setting with the help of fat pointers. MSWasm [34] extends the WebAssembly [18] with custom memory safety instructions. They introduce a colour-based memory-safety monitor and show it is memory-safe. In addition, they formalise a compilation scheme from a minimal idealised subset of C to MSWasm and prove that the compiler enforces memory safety. In this work, we do not formalise memory safety but observe that MSWasm's colour-based memory safety can be directly applied to Fides.

SECOMP [24, 51] introduces secure compartmentalizing compilation and extends the CompCert-verified C compiler with support for compartments that target the CHERI capability machine. Unlike Fides, SECOMP does not support tail calls and exceptions, and provides no special support for HoFs. We do not formalise the compilation of C to Fides. We leave this to future work. Recent work [57] has also mechanised the formal semantics of CHERI dialect of C, clarifying the behaviour of capabilities and undefined behaviours. In this work, we do not focus on the source language but formalise the semantics of the hardware and the ABI.

8 Conclusion

In this work, we have presented Fides, an intra-process compartmentalization scheme for applications that mix safe and unsafe languages and deploy untrusted third-party libraries. Fides specifically handles language features commonly found in high-level safe languages, such as HoFs, tail calls and exceptions. Given the increasing awareness of the threats of unsafe languages [2, 20] and the impossibility of a wholesale move of large legacy codebases to a safe language, we believe that Fides will provide an important stepping stone that will ease such a move.

Data-Availability Statement

We will submit a docker container with detailed instructions on compiling and executing the benchmarks discussed in the paper.

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