

Memory safety & Programming Languages

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Memory Safety

- A system is memory safe when it is devoid of *memory-related errors*
 - ▶ Buffer overflows
 - ▶ Use-after-free
 - ▶ Out-of-bounds access
 - ▶ Null pointer dereference
 - ▶ ...
- Memory unsafety leads to *undefined behaviours*
 - ▶ Opens doors to *security vulnerabilities*



¬Memory Safety \implies ¬Security

Microsoft: 70 percent of all security bugs are memory safety issues

Percentage of memory safety issues has been hovering at 70 percent for the past 12 years.



Written by **Catalin Cimpanu**, Contributor
Feb. 11, 2019 at 7:48 a.m. PT






Image: Matt Miller

/ related



Worried about the Windows BitLocker recovery bug? 6 things you need to know



The Windows 10 clock is ticking: 5 ways to save your old PC in 2025 (most are free)

Memory safety

The Chromium project finds that around 70% of our serious security bugs are [memory safety problems](#). Our next major project is to prevent such bugs at source.

The problem


Around 70% of our high severity security bugs are memory unsafety problems (that is, mistakes with C/C++ pointers). Half of those are use-after-free bugs.

High+, impacting stable

Security-related assert
7.1%


Other
23.9%

Other memory unsafety
32.9%



¬Memory Safety \implies ¬Security

Vulnerabilities by Cause



90% of Android vulnerabilities are memory safety issues

Fish in a Barrel
@LazyFishBarrel

Replying to @LazyFishBarrel

Thanks to Google's detailed technical data we can provide total memory unsafety statistics for public 0days by year:

2014	5/11	45%
2015	22/28	79%
2016	22/25	88%
2017	17/22	77%
2018	12/12	100%
2019	9/10	90%
Total	87/108	81%

80% of the exploited vulnerabilities of known 0-days were memory safety issues

Memory Safety Recommendations

The Case for Memory Safe Roadmaps

Why Both C-Suite Executives and Technical Experts Need to Take Memory Safe Coding Seriously

Publication: December 2023

United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
United States National Security Agency
United States Federal Bureau of Investigation
Australian Signals Directorate's Australian Cyber Security Centre
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security
United Kingdom National Cyber Security Centre
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre
Computer Emergency Response Team New Zealand

THE WHITE HOUSE



MENU



FEBRUARY 26, 2024

Press Release: Future Software Should Be Memory Safe

 ▶ ONCD ▶ BRIEFING ROOM ▶ PRESS RELEASE

Leaders in Industry Support White House Call to Address Root Cause of Many of the Worst Cyber Attacks

Read the full report [here](#)

1. Use memory-safe languages (primary)
2. Formally verify software (support)
3. Use secure hardware (support)

Memory Safety and Programming Languages

- Unsafe languages
 - C, C++, Assembly, Objective-C
- Safe languages
 - With the help of a garbage collector (GC) — JavaScript, Python, Java, Go, OCaml, ...
 - Without a GC — Rust
- Unsafe parts of safe languages
 - Unsafe Rust, unsafe package in Go, Obj in OCaml



*Safe-by-construction
programming language*




industrial-strength, pragmatic, functional programming language

Industry



Projects




20% of Wall Street trade goes through OCaml

Functional core with imperative and object-oriented features

Native (x86, Arm, Power, RISC-V), JavaScript, WebAssembly

OCaml Performance – Web Server



<https://github.com/ocaml-multicore/eio>


How far can we push this?

How about an entire OS?

Why? Monolithic OS Icebergs

**Code you
want to run**

**Code your
operating
system insists
you need!**




Huge TCB \Rightarrow
Security concern

Written in
memory-unsafe
languages

MirageOS Unikernels

- MirageOS is a **library OS** to build specialised **Unikernels** containing only what is needed by the application
 - Cut the complexity by designing the layers as independent memory-safe libraries.
- Rely on the OCaml for memory safety, modular static analysis, dead-code elimination, etc.
- Used in
 - Docker for Mac and Windows
 - NetHSM — hardware security modules
 - SpaceOS
- See mirage.io



Available Libraries

Network:

Ethernet, IP, UDP, TCP, HTTP 1.0/1.1/2.0, ALPN, DNS, ARP, DHCP, SMTP, IRC, cap-n-proto, emails

Storage:

block device, Ramdisk, Qcow, B-trees, VHD, Zlib, Gzip, Lzo, Git, Tar, FAT32

Data-structures:

LRU, Rabin's fingerprint, bloom filters, adaptative radix trees, discrete interval encoding trees

Security:

x.509, ASN1, TLS, SSH

Crypto:

hashes, checksums

Ciphers (AES, 3DES, RC4, ChaCha20/Poly1305)

AEAD primitives (AES-GCM, AES-CCM)

Public keys (RSA, DSA, DH)

Fortuna

- *Reimplemented in OCaml*
- TLS: “rigorous engineering”
 - same pure code to generate test oracles, verify oracle against real-world TLS traces and the real implementation
 - Use Fiat (Coq extraction) for crypto primitives.


Not-quite-so-broken TLS: lessons in re-engineering a security protocol specification and implementation

David Kaloper-Meršinjak[†], Hannes Mehnert[†], Anil Madhavapeddy and Peter Sewell
University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory
first.last@cl.cam.ac.uk


[†] *These authors contributed equally to this work*



Bitcoin Piñata

- <https://hannes.robur.coop/Posts/Pinata>
- 1.1 MB Unikernel, which ran from 2015 to 2018
- Hold the key to 10 bitcoins (peak worth \$165k)
 - Now worth ~\$1M
- A successful authenticated TLS session reveals the private Bitcoin key
- 500,000 accesses to the Piñata website, more than 150,000 attempts at connecting to the Piñata bounty
- The bitcoins were safe!



ocaml.org



 OCaml 


OCaml

An industrial-strength functional programming language with an emphasis on expressiveness and safety

[Install](#) [About OCaml](#)


Latest release: 5.3.0
Long Term Support release: 4.14.2

mirage.io




MIRAGE OS

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A programming framework for building type-safe, modular systems

[Get Started](#) [See on Github](#) [See Paper](#)